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LOVING AND LEGITIMACY: IRS REGULATION OF TAX
RETURN PREPARATION
STEVE R. JOHNSON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE validity of regulations promulgated by the Department of Treasury is a principal battleground in contemporary federal taxation. So
far, the clash has had two phases: establishment and implementation.
Phase one entailed the destruction of the citadel of tax insularity, the bastion within which tax specialists thought to keep themselves safe from having to learn and apply general administrative law. In cases such as Swallows
Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner,1 Mannella v. Commissioner,2 Lantz v. Commissioner,3 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. Commissioner,4
and the welter of cases culminating in United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC,5 the old guard was defeated. It is now firmly established that
tax, no less than other regulatory areas, is subject to the rules of administrative law.6 That proposition having been settled, we are now in phase
two: implementation, the application of specific administrative law rules in
particular tax contexts.
Loving v. IRS7 is the most recent major phase two case. In Loving, the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia—later affirmed by the
D.C. Circuit—invalidated a major Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initiative to regulate previously unreg* University Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Email:
sjohnson@law.fsu.edu.
1. 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), rev’g 126 T.C. 6 (2006). See generally Steve R.
Johnson, Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 112 TAX
NOTES 773 (2006); Steve R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of
National Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351 (2006) [hereinafter Swallows I].
2. 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’g 132 T.C. 196 (2009).
3. 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), rev’g 132 T.C. 131 (2009).
4. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); see also Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future of Tax
Regulations, 130 TAX NOTES 1547 (2011) [hereinafter Mayo and the Future]; Steve R.
Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV.
269 (2012) [hereinafter Preserving Fairness in Tax].
5. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); see also Steve R. Johnson, Reflections on Home Concrete, 13 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
6. See Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law
in Tax, 128 TAX NOTES 837 (2010).
7. 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
For discussion of the circuit court’s decision, see Frank G. Colella, Loving Is Affirmed: IRS Lacked Authority to Regulate Preparers, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 78-5 (2014)
(concluding that Loving was technically correct but urging legislative reversal);
Donald T. Williamson & James S. Gale, Loving and the End of RTRPs, 2014 TAX
NOTES TODAY 78-4 (2014) (same).

(515)
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ulated tax return preparers.8 Alarmed by what it perceived as widespread
incompetence and ethical lapses, in 2011, Treasury asserted authority to
regulate such preparers without additional legislative support—despite
having maintained for generations that it lacked such authority.9 The district and circuit courts concluded that the Government’s prior view—not
its current view—of its authority is correct. The courts therefore invalidated the 2011 regulations.
The Government chose not to seek certiorari review of Loving by the
Supreme Court, but legislation to reverse Loving is a possibility.10 Whichever view ultimately prevails, Loving is an important case, both practically
and doctrinally. Practically, the regulatory initiative challenged in Loving
involves hundreds of thousands of return preparers, millions of their customers, and millions or billions in annual revenues for the federal fisc.
Doctrinally, Loving bears on an issue of fundamental significance not
just as to tax regulations but as to administrative law generally. Loving is a
Chevron case.11 When Chevron applies, it is Step One, not Step Two, that
typically poses the greater challenge for the agency.12 Thus, two matters
become crucial: (1) what sources may a court legitimately consult at Step
8. Among other requirements discussed more fully in infra notes 15–23, the
new regulations required preparers to pass an examination and take a specified
amount of continuing professional education. See Who May Practice, 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.3(f) (2013); Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,713 (proposed Aug. 23, 2010) (proposed regulation); 76 Fed.
Reg. 32,286 (June 3, 2011) (final regulation).
9. In contrast, some other federal agencies have long asserted what the Treasury and IRS denied until 2011. For instance, regulations adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission provided that practicing before the Commission
includes: “Providing advice in respect of [securities laws and regulations] regarding any document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted to . . .
the Commission, including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing . . . any such document.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (2013).
10. As of the time of this writing, the Government appears to have decided
not to seek further review of Loving. See Michael Cohn, IRS Commissioner Sees Further Appeals on Tax Preparer Lawsuit as Unlikely, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/IRS-Commissioner-Sees-Further-AppealsTax-Preparer-Lawsuit-Unlikely-69653-1.html. The Administration advocates legislative reversal of Loving. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 244 (2014), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf. Legislation to that effect has been introduced in the
House. See H.R. 1570, 113th Cong. (2013). A Senate hearing on Loving and return preparer regulation has also taken place. See Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong.
(2014). For a description of the hearings, see William Hoffman, Koskinen Urges
Senate Finance to Reconsider Preparer Regulation, TAX NOTES (Apr. 14, 2014), at 171.
11. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
12. Under Chevron’s Step One, the court applies the statute if the intent of the
statute is unambiguous. See id. at 842–43. Step Two is reached if the statute is
ambiguous; at Step Two, the agency’s interpretation is upheld unless it is unreasonable. See id.
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One in its attempt to determine whether the statute is unambiguous, and
(2) in what spirit—exacting or sympathetic to the agency—are these
sources to be evaluated?
Thus far, the courts have hardly spoken with one voice as to these
questions. The Loving opinions reflect what may be the central tendency
of recent decisions: their approach to sources is principally textual, and
their spirit is exacting, evincing no thumb on the scale in favor of the
agency. Clashes as to these issues will continue for a long time, but the
Loving opinions surely will have an impact on them.
This article has six principal parts. Part II describes the relevant statutory framework, the practical stakes at issue, and the challenged regulatory
initiative.
Part III describes the district court’s decision in Loving. It notes that
the district court viewed Chevron’s Step One as controlling and that the
court took an exacting textual approach to conducting the Step One inquiry. The court focused on the statutory phrase “regulate the practice of
representatives of persons before the [IRS].”13 Its rejection of the regulations was based on the court’s understanding of “practice,” reinforced by
wider contextual considerations. Part III describes these aspects of the
district court’s opinion and critiques the proffered wider contextual
considerations.
Part IV critiques the “practice” rationale relied upon by the district
court. It concludes that this rationale is weak and that the Government
has the better position on this issue.
However, Part V maintains that the weakness of the district court’s
“practice” rationale does not mean it reached the wrong decision. In my
view, the district court failed to enlist the key portion of the statute. The
superior objection to the regulations is that return preparers are not “representatives.” On that basis, I believe that the district court reached the
right decision although on the wrong grounds. However, Part V acknowledges that the issue is close and that a court less wedded to a textual approach to Chevron Step One could reach the contrary holding.
Part VI takes the Step One statutory interpretation to a deeper level.
It contends that Loving bears important similarities to FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,14 a 2000 decision by the Supreme Court invalidating at Chevron’s Step One a major initiative by a different agency. The
Loving district court cited Brown & Williamson in passing, but the case deserves much more attention in this context. Brown & Williamson supports
the invalidation of the Loving regulation in at least two ways not yet substantially explored in the literature on Loving: (1) the use of a hyper-contextual lens for analyzing Step One, and (2) the application of a “major
question” exception to Chevron deference. Part VI develops these
perspectives.
13. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012).
14. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Finally, the Epilogue describes the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. The circuit
court’s approach resembles that of the district court in many respects.
However, the circuit court made more of the “representatives” and Brown
& Williamson arguments developed in Parts V and VI of this article.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Statutory Framework

The key statute for Loving purposes is 31 U.S.C. § 330, which provides,
in its current form, as follows:
(a) Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury
may—
(1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons
before the Department of the Treasury; and
(2) before admitting a representative to practice, require
that the representative demonstrate—
(A) good character;
(B) good reputation;
(C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative
to provide to persons valuable service; and
(D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their cases.
(b) After notice and opportunity for a proceeding, the Secretary
may suspend or disbar from practice before the Department,
or censure, a representative who—
(1) is incompetent;
(2) is disreputable;
(3) violates regulations prescribed under this section; or
(4) with intent to defraud, willfully and knowingly misleads
or threatens the person being represented or a prospective person to be represented.
The Secretary may impose a monetary penalty on any representative described in the preceding sentence. If the representative
was acting on behalf of an employer or any firm or other entity in
connection with the conduct giving rise to such penalty, the Secretary may impose a monetary penalty on such employer, firm, or
entity if it knew, or reasonably should have known, of such conduct. Such penalty shall not exceed the gross income derived (or
to be derived) from the conduct giving rise to the penalty and
may be in addition to, or in lieu of, any suspension, disbarment,
or censure of the representative.
(c) After notice and opportunity for a hearing to any appraiser,
the Secretary may—
(1) provide that appraisals by such appraiser shall not have
any probative effect in any administrative proceeding
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before the Department of the Treasury or the Internal
Revenue Service, and
(2) bar such appraiser from presenting evidence or testimony in any such proceeding.
(d) Nothing in this section or in any other provision of law shall
be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the
Treasury to impose standards applicable to the rendering of
written advice with respect to any entity, transaction plan or
arrangement, or other plan or arrangement, which is of a
type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for
tax avoidance or evasion.15
Some history is in order. The original version of current section 330
was enacted in 1884, more than a generation before enactment of the
modern federal income tax.16 All quarters appear to agree as to the reason Congress acted in 1884. In the aftermath of the War Between the
States,17 and in the throes of westward expansion, there were “mounting
complaints about misconduct by unscrupulous attorneys and claims agents
[ ] represent[ing] military pensioners, persons with claims for lost horses,
and others with claims for compensation from the federal government . . . .”18 Attorneys and others competed to solicit claimants. One
Congressman described the situation this way:
While there are some very reputable gentlemen engaged in the
business, who charge reasonable fees, there are many who are
very disreputable, and who have been guilty of bad practices, and
have victimized many a poor soldier who was unable to take care
of himself. . . . The object of [the 1884 statute] is to protect
soldiers against such practices.19
Against this background, Congress enacted the following statute:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing claimants before his Department, and may
require of such persons, agents and attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of claimants, that they shall show they
15. 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).
16. This fact should have no bearing on the outcome in Loving. The federal
government was levying non-income taxes—principally excise taxes—in 1884. Section 330 is plastic enough to cover the representatives of claimants of types of
claims that arose after its date of enactment.
17. Before I moved to Florida, I would have said the “Civil War.”
18. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp.
2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-0385), 2012 WL 8133439. The National Taxpayer
Advocate, a staunch supporter of the challenged regulations, accepts the accuracy
of this characterization of purpose. See Nina E. Olson, More than a “Mere” Preparer:
Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX NOTES 767, 767, 775 (2013).
19. 15 CONG. REC. 5219 (1884) (statement of Rep. Richard Townshend).
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are of good character and in good repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render such claimants valuable service, and otherwise competent to advise and assist such
claimants in the presentation of their cases. And such Secretary
may, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, suspend and
disbar from further practice before his Department any such person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent, disreputable,
or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall with intent to defraud, in any manner willfully and
knowingly deceive, mislead, or threaten any claimant or prospective claimant, by word, circular, letter, or by advertisement.20
Section 330 substantially took its current form in 1982,21 when the
term “representative of persons” was substituted for “agents, attorneys, or
other persons representing claimants.” A committee report states that the
1982 revision was stylistic, with no change in substance intended.22 This
characterization appears to be uncontroversial.23
B.

Practical Stakes

As described in greater detail below,24 some types of tax advisors25 are
already subject to extensive regulation under authority other than the regulation challenged in Loving.26 As the district court acknowledged, Loving
has no legal effect on such advisors.27 Instead, Loving and the regulations
there at issue involve otherwise substantially unregulated tax return
preparers.28
Such preparers are a major part of the tax reporting and compliance
matrix. Of the approximately 150 million individual income tax returns
filed annually, nearly 80 million are prepared by return preparers, and
over 42 million of those returns were prepared by unregulated
20. Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258–59 (1884).
21. Various minor changes have been made since 1982.
22. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-651, at 19 (1982); see also Poole v. United States, No.
84-0300, 1984 WL 742, at *2 (D.D.C. June 29, 1984).
23. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 18, at 34; Olson,
supra note 18, at 776.
24. For a further discussion of this topic, see infra notes 231–35 and accompanying text.
25. Chief among these types are attorneys, certified public accountants, and
enrolled agents. Other types include certified acceptance agents, enrolled actuaries, and enrolled retirement plan agents.
26. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C § 500(b)–(c) (2012) (dealing with practice of lawyers and
certified public accountants before IRS); 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2009).
27. Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d 108, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2013).
28. Only four states—California, New York, Maryland, and Oregon—regulate
tax return preparers. For descriptions of those states’ regulatory regimes, see IRS
PUBLICATION 4832, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW 18–22 (2009) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 4832], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4832.pdf.
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preparers.29 The IRS puts the number of such preparers at 600,000 to
700,000.30
The Government is convinced that a sizeable number of these unregulated preparers are inadequately trained, incompetent, or crooked, hurting both the customers of these preparers and the federal fisc.
Accordingly, Treasury promulgated the 2011 regulations in order:
[T]o improve the service provided by the tax-return-preparation
industry, to protect taxpayers who use such services, and to enhance tax administration by reducing the considerable lost tax
revenues that are attributable to the significant number of taxreturn preparers who are incompetent and/or unscrupulous.”31
Many persons of great experience, ability, and integrity inside the
Government firmly believe in these purposes, and they are not alone. For
example:
•

•

•

In congressional hearings, the American Bar Association, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the National Association of Enrolled Agents, the National Society of
Accountants, and the National Association of Tax Professionals all testified in support of regulating return preparers.32
As described in greater detail in subpart II.C below, the IRS
submitted heightened return preparer regulation to an extensive comment process. According to the IRS, “commentators
overwhelmingly expressed support for efforts to increase the
oversight of tax return preparers,” including support ranging
from 88% to 99% for particular aspects of enhanced
regulation.33
Amici briefs were filed in Loving in support of the challenged
regulation, including briefs by the National Consumer Law

29. See Olson, supra note 18, at 767, 769 n.14 (citing IRS COMPLIANCE DATA
WAREHOUSE, Individual Returns Transaction File and Return Preparers Database, TY
2011 (2013)).
30. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 76
Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,299 (June 3, 2011).
31. Brief for the Appellants at 4, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 1282685, at *4.
32. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, U.S. H.R., 109TH CONG., FRAUD IN INCOME TAX RETURN PREPARATION (2005).
33. IRS PUBLICATION 4832, supra note 28, at 2.

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR304.txt

522

unknown

Seq: 8

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

19-AUG-14

14:36

[Vol. 59: p. 515

Center and National Community Tax Coalition34 and by five
former Commissioners of Internal Revenue.35
• Although the commentary is divided, many commentators
support the desirability of increased regulation of return
preparers.36
One should think twice and be quite sure of the facts before disputing
such collective wisdom. Nonetheless, I harbor some doubts. I do not
doubt that there are problem areas. When the actions of hundreds of
thousands of human beings of any walk of life are scrutinized, both incompetence and chicanery are sure to be found in abundance.37 Instead, my
concerns relate to the efficacy of the cure and the possibility of side
effects.
As to efficacy, it would be less than rigorous to simply assume that
government regulation will sweep away all or most ills. Beyond count are
the government regulatory programs which, though adopted with fanfare
and enthusiasm, have failed to achieve their objectives or even have made
things worse. The sentiment “there ought to be a law” may have
prompted as many feckless or harmful laws as effectual and salutary laws.
Unregulated preparers do make errors, but so do already regulated
preparers like enrolled agents, certified public accountants, and lawyers.
And so do IRS employees. The error rate of information given to taxpayers by IRS taxpayer service representatives has been a problem for decades.38 Similarly, unregulated preparers do commit or abet fraud, but so
do already regulated advisors. My co-authored text on tax crimes is strewn
34. Brief for Amici Curiae Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. and Nat’l Cmty. Tax Coal.
in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Arguing for Reversal of the District
Court, Loving v. IRS., 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL
1386247.
35. Brief Amici Curiae of Former Comm’rs of Internal Revenue in Support of
Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS., 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 135061), 2013 WL 1386248 [hereinafter Brief of Former Comm’rs].
36. See, e.g., Janet Novack, Federal Judge Shoots Down IRS Attempt to Regulate All
Paid Tax Preparers, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2013, 11:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/janetnovack/2013/01/18/federal-judge-shoots-down-irs-attempt-to-regulateall-paid-tax-preparers/ (quoting Claudia Hill as calling district court’s decision “a
loss for all taxpayers”); Donald T. Williamson & James S. Gale, RTRPS and Their
“Practice” Before the IRS, 139 TAX NOTES 179 (2013).
37. The Government justifies the challenged regulations in part through studies showing that unregulated preparers make many mistakes. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 2008-40-171, MOST TAX RETURN PREPARERS BY A
LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS
(2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/
200840171fr.pdf.
38. See David Brunori, Government Power, Cronyism, and the IRS Running Amok,
134 TAX NOTES 1599 (2012) (“The irony of the IRS wanting to ensure preparer
competency is palpable. The Service is notorious for handing out incorrect information to ordinary citizens who call for help.”).
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with convicted accountants and attorneys,39 and “[l]awyer disbarment lists
are littered with unethical individuals despite government regulation of
their profession.”40 And IRS employees occasionally engage in criminal
acts.41 In addition, it has been questioned whether the examination the
IRS intends to use is sufficiently demanding to assure competence.42
As to side effects, some have decried the challenged regulations as
another step in the over-regulation of America.43 Others have noted the
lamentable tendency of regulation to create or protect oligopolies by erecting barriers to entry. From this standpoint, support of the regulation
by some organizations is seen as motivated less by the public interest and
more by anti-competitive behavior.44
It is unnecessary to ascribe sinister motives. The pervasiveness of the
law of unintended consequences is enough to inspire caution. For instance, some critics fear that the regulations could raise return preparation costs to taxpayers and decrease the supply of preparers.45
I take no position as to the competing arguments on the desirability
of the challenged regulations. The IRS strongly argued the necessity of
the new rule at the district court level. The district court properly ignored
39. JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON & SCOTT A.
SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES (2d ed. forthcoming 2014).
40. Brunori, supra note 38, at 1599 (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Payne v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2013–64 (2013) (involving
IRS employee who created bogus documents to substantiate fictitious deductions
claimed on her return); Complaint, United States v. Oseni, No. 8:13-mj-01016 (D.
Md. May 2, 2013) (involving IRS employee accused of altering and falsifying receipts to support personal consumption charged to IRS credit card); Stuart Pfeifer,
IRS Agent Pleads Guilty to Filing False Tax Returns, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 5, 2011, 6:12
PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/01/irs-agent-pleads-guiltyto-filing-false-tax-returns.html (discussing IRS agent who pleaded guilty to filing
false tax returns for himself and his relatives, obtaining thousands of dollars in
fraudulent refunds); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office W.D. Tenn. (Apr. 17,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/tnw/news/2013/APR171RS.html
(announcing twenty-four current and former IRS employees indicted for making
false claims for government benefits).
42. See, e.g., Joe Kristan, Court Throws Out IRS Preparer Regulation Scheme!, ROTH
& CO., P.C. (Jan. 18, 2013), http://rothcpa.com/2013/01/court-throws-out-irspreparer-regulation-scheme/.
43. See, e.g., Allen Buckley, Is Treasury’s New Reg Scheme for Return Preparers Lawful?, 137 TAX NOTES 285, 285, 294 (2012) (citing Over-Regulated America, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18 2012)).
44. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Inquisitive Relief at 29, Loving v.
IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-5061). The fact that H&R Block,
Jackson Hewitt, and other large companies would be exempt from some of the
regulations, and that a former H&R Block executive helped write some of the
rules, contribute to such concerns. See Brunori, supra note 38, at 1600; Kristan,
supra note 42; Opinion, H&R Blockheads: The IRS Wants to Save You from Your Rogue
Tax Accountant, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640572196836150.html.
45. See Buckley, supra note 43, at 294.

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR304.txt

524

unknown

Seq: 10

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

19-AUG-14

14:36

[Vol. 59: p. 515

this contention.46 Loving is about the validity of the regulations, not their
wisdom.47 Accordingly, for the remainder of this Article, I assume arguendo that the challenged regulations would advance the public good, and I
focus solely on their legality.
C.

Promulgation of the Regulations

It took over a decade of study and advocacy to produce the 2011 regulations. Before she became the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson
identified shoddy return preparation as a problem in congressional testimony in 1997 and 1998.48 After taking office, her 2002 report to Congress
urged adoption of rules requiring registration, testing, and continuing education of unenrolled return preparers.49
In 2006 and 2008, auditors from the Government Accountability Office and the office of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration visited small samples of a variety of return preparers. They discovered
substantial errors in filed returns and tests on hypothetical fact patterns.50
In June 2009, IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman announced a review
to focus on the competency and conduct of paid tax return preparers.
The review included a series of public hearings in which taxpayers, consumer groups, and preparers participated.51 The results of the review
were announced six months later in a document entitled Return Preparer
Review.52 It recommended the following changes:
•

Mandatory registration and use of a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN), for all persons paid to prepare, or to
help prepare, all or substantially all of a federal tax return;

46. For a discussion of the current prevailing approach towards application of
Chevron, see infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
47. Of course, a judge’s perception of where wisdom lays has influenced the
outcome of more than one close issue of law.
48. See, e.g., IRS Restructuring: Hearing on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
105th Cong. 337 (1998) (statement of Nina Olson).
49. See IRS PUBLICATION 2104, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: FY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2002).
50. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2008-4-171, MOST TAX
RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2008), available at https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/
/200840171fr.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-06-563T,
PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS
ERRORS (2006); Memorandum from Michael E. McKenney, Assistant Inspector
Gen. for Audit, for Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit, to
Comm’r, Small Business/Self-Employed Div.
51. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-60, 2009-32 I.R.B. 181, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
THE TAX RETURN PREPARER COMMUNITY AND INCREASED TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE. Several IRS advisory groups also called for enhanced regulation. See IRS PUBLICATION
4832, supra note 28, at 23–25 (describing work done by Taxpayer Advocacy Panel,
IRS Advisory Council, Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Council, and IRS
Oversight Board).
52. See IRS PUBLICATION 4832, supra note 28.
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Mandatory basic competence tests, but with exemptions for
attorneys, certified public accountants, and enrolled agents
(since they already have testing requirements to earn their
credentials), certain non-signing preparers supervised by
them, and non-Form 1040 preparers;
Continuing education obligation of fifteen hours per year, including ten hours in federal tax law, three in tax law changes,
and two in ethics;
Ethics requirements in the form of compliance checks and
being subject to the professional responsibility standards in
Treasury Circular 230; and
A publicly searchable database and public education
campaign.53

The Review concluded that these changes could be effected through
regulations and “do[ ] not require additional legislation.”54 The regulations were proposed in 2010 and finalized in 2011.
III.

DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION

Operatively, the district court’s invalidation of the challenged regulations proceeded through five stages. The court (1) identified Chevron’s
Step One as controlling, (2) took a searching and textual approach to
Step One, (3) found the definition of the statutory term “practice” to be
decisive, (4) reinforced its conclusion through a wider contextual analysis,
and (5) determined the appropriate remedies.
A.

Step One as Controlling

The named plaintiffs in Loving are Sabina Loving, Elmer Kilian, and
John Gambino. They all currently prepare tax returns for compensation
without having obtained licenses or certification from the IRS, although
they all had obtained or applied for Preparer Tax Identification Numbers.
They were joined by the Institute for Justice, a national public interest law
firm, which seeks to protect the rights of entrepreneurs.
The plaintiffs sued the IRS under the Administrative Procedure Act
(the APA)55 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,56 challenging the validity
of the 2011 regulations. Both sides moved for summary judgment.57
53. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-59 (June 5 2012), available at http://www.irs
.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Marks-Third-Anniversary-of-Return-Preparer-Review;Urges-Required-Preparers-to-Take-Competency-Test-as-Soon-as-Possible.
54. IRS PUBLICATION 4832, supra note 28, at 33.
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012) (involving judicial review provisions of APA).
The APA applies to the Treasury and to the IRS as part of the Treasury. See id.
§ 551(1) (applying APA to Treasury); I.R.C. § 7803(a) (2012) (applying APA to
IRS as part of Treasury).
56. 28 U.S.C §§ 2201–2202 (2012).
57. The district court restyled the motions, finding that “the pleadings in this
case more accurately seek the Court’s review of an administrative decision. [The
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The district court identified Chevron as the standard controlling the
challenge. Subsequent cases58 established that Chevron does not apply to
every case in which the agency’s action is challenged.59 The Government
argued that the case should be resolved in its favor without resorting to
Chevron, because every agency, including the Treasury Department and
IRS, has inherent authority to regulate persons practicing before it.60
Commonly, however, statutes prescribe agencies’ authority to regulate admission to practice.61
Language in some cases might be read to call into question the existence of inherent, non-statutory authority.62 However, the district court
did not go so far. Instead, it rejected the Government’s contention because of the “specific controls over general” canon of construction.63 An
agency “cannot rely on its general authority to make rules necessary to
carry out its functions when a specific statutory directive defines the relevant functions of [the agency] in a particular area.”64 The district court
held that section 330, by specifically defining Treasury’s authority to regulate practitioners before it, controls over Treasury’s inherent authority.65
The issue in Loving is the extent of the agency’s authority. Questions
sometimes have been raised as to whether Chevron applies to agencies’ determinations of their own jurisdiction, but those questions are no longer
troubling. After the district court rendered its decision, the Supreme
usual summary judgment rules do] not apply because of the limited role of a court
in reviewing the administrative record.” Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72
(D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); see also Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576
(2000); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
59. This creates the Step Zero issue because whether Chevron applies at all is
logically anterior to application of Steps One and Two. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 122 (1926)
(upholding authority of B.T.A. to prescribe rules of practice, including rules as to
admission of attorneys to practice before it).
61. This has been so since the founding of the Republic. See Act of July 27,
1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28 (granting War Department authority “to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with the law, for the Government of [the] Department”
(quoting Rev. Stat. § 161, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952) (recodified at 5 U.S.C. § 301
(2012)))); see also Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 17, 19, 16 Stat. 200 (“The Commissioner [of Patents] . . . may from time to time establish rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office” and
“[for] gross misconduct . . . may refuse to recognize any person as a patent agent,
either generally or in any particular case.”).
62. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n
agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power
upon it.”).
63. See generally Steve R. Johnson, When General Statutes and Specific Statutes Conflict, 57 STATE TAX NOTES 113 (2010).
64. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
65. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2013).
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Court decisively held that Chevron does indeed apply to issues of
jurisdiction.66
Having found that Chevron controls, the district court identified Step
One as determinative because the plaintiffs offered “no independent argument” at Step Two.67 Strictly speaking, this conclusion does not follow
from the premise. A party may present the same arguments at Step One
and Step Two.68 It is theoretically possible that those arguments are insufficient to persuade the court that the statute is clear (Step One) but do
suffice to persuade the court that the regulation is unreasonable (Step
Two). However, that margin of possibility is small. As a practical matter,
even if not necessarily as a theoretical matter, the district court is correct
that the plaintiffs win at Step One or they do not win at all.
For completeness, I add that although the Loving plaintiffs did not
advance independent Step Two arguments, amici supporting the plaintiffs
in the circuit court did so. They argued that the regulations fail Step
Two—and for the same reasons are arbitrary and capricious69—because
Treasury failed to adequately explain the choices it made in the regulations and because they reflect a flawed cost-benefit analysis.70 The amici
also argued that the regulations violate the Regulatory Flexibility Act71
and the APA notice-and-comment rules.72 Arguments of this ilk are of
66. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
67. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
68. The plaintiffs made the same arguments at Step Two as at Step One. See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 16 n.12, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No.
12-0385), 2012 WL 8133439. Thus, they advanced no “independent” argument at
Step Two, but they did not concede Step Two.
69. The APA empowers courts to set aside an agency action that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). Case law and commentary sometimes disagree as to
whether Chevron’s Step Two and the arbitrary and capricious standard merge or
are independent inquiries. The answer to this conundrum is, I think, that arbitrary and capricious has both a procedural dimension and a substantive dimension. The procedural dimension includes such things as the agency’s duty to
consider all relevant factors and to explain its choices. The substantive dimension
is whether the agency’s balancing process was rational. Chevron’s Step Two subsumes, or is congruent with, the substantive dimension of arbitrary and capricious,
but it does not subsume the procedural dimension of arbitrary and capricious. See
Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
Chevron’s Step Two subsumes substantive dimension of arbitrary and capricious).
70. Brief of Ronda Gordon, Dennis Tafelski, Jason Dinesen, Christine Engel,
Russell Fox, Joe Kristan, Richard Schiveley, and the Tax Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11–13, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 2285575 [hereinafter Tax Foundation Brief].
An administrative action is arbitrary and capricious if, inter alia, the agency “failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem” or failed to “cogently explain why
it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.” Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 48 (1983).
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–602 (2012).
72. See id. § 553; see also Tax Foundation Brief, supra note 70.
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growing importance in tax litigation. I have explored these types of arguments in other articles,73 so I will not probe these contentions here.
B.
1.

Exacting Textual Approach

Currently Prevailing Approach

The spirit in which a court approaches the Step One analysis is important. A court wanting to uphold the agency’s decision often will find ambiguity, which will allow it to reach Step Two, where the agency usually (but
not invariably) wins.74 A more rigorous approach to Step One will result
in fewer agency wins.
Although examples of both approaches can be found in case law, an
exacting Step One analysis is currently the dominant approach. In a recent Chevron case, for instance, the Supreme Court endorsed “taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’
authority.”75
This is consistent with a broad movement in recent years, across a
variety of areas of administrative law, “exhibit[ing] a return to congressional primacy both in matters of interpretation and matters of policy . . . .”76 Three instances of this movement appear below.
First, of particular relevance to Loving, “the Court has moved away
from deference to agency statutory interpretations toward a more traditional Court-centered approach with the focus on congressional intent.”77
This has resulted in “a significant expansion of the scope of Step One, so
that many more interpretive questions are resolved based on clear congressional intent than might have been anticipated.”78
Second, a similar, less deferential approach is also gaining traction in
application of Step Two. Although Step Two is typically agency-friendly,
agencies have sometimes lost at Step Two.79 A more vigorous level of scrutiny has been apparent in a number of recent Step Two cases.80
73. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Arbitrary and Capricious: Treasury’s Duty of Explanation as to Tax Regulations, 64 DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2014); Mayo and the Future,
supra note 4, at 1555–56; Preserving Fairness in Tax, supra note 4, at pt. VI.
74. See, e.g., Robinson v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 44, 69 (2002) (en banc).
75. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
76. Jack M. Beerman, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 727, 729 (2009). Professor Beerman approves of this turn and gives examples of it.
77. Id. at 747.
78. Id. (adding that “it is now difficult to discern a difference between Chevron
Step One and traditional, pre-Chevron, statutory interpretation”); see, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
79. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Northpoint
Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d
984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819 (1991).
80. See, e.g., Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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Third, agencies traditionally have received a high degree of deference
when interpreting their own regulations.81 However, in recent years,
many prominent decisions have invalidated tax82 and non-tax83 regulations on the basis of interpretive exercises, concluding that the agency’s
position was inconsistent with the clear text of the regulation.
Pendulums swing in legal doctrine no less than in hem-lines and 3-D
movies. Thus there is no guarantee that exacting application of Chevron’s
Step One will always be the norm. It is, however, the currently prevailing
approach.
2.

District Court’s Approach

The district court in Loving proceeded in the currently dominant
spirit of exacting analysis. Having identified Chevron Step One as the
schwerpunkt84 of the case, the district court stated the inquiry as to whether
“using the traditional tools of the statutory construction,” it could fairly be
said that the 1884 statute made clear Congress’s intent as to the Treasury’s
ability to regulate return preparers.85 The court began “where all such
inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”86
Desiring to reach Step Two, where it feels itself in a strong position,
the Government argued that the statute is ambiguous because it fails to
define “representative” and “practice,” both of which can have broad
meanings. The district court found this approach “simplistic” and rejected it because “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities
but of statutory context.”87 This is an eminently textual approach. Modern textualism takes a broader angle of vision than mere literalistic scru81. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945). But see Steve R. Johnson, Auer/
Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2013) (describing
Tax Court as exception to this tradition of deference).
82. See, e.g., Estate of Petter v. Comm’r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1021–23 (9th Cir.
2011); Estate of Christiansen v. Comm’r, 586 F.3d 1061, 1062 (8th Cir. 2009).
83. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
84. In German military theory, the schwerpunkt is the decisive point, the place
where the battle will be won or lost.
85. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984). As the ensuing discussion makes clear, the Loving district court
made heavy use of canons of statutory interpretation. Canons are among the
“traditional tools,” and they are properly part of the Step One analysis. See City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). See generally Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being
Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791 (2010).
86. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Caraco
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012)), aff’d, 742
F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
87. Id. at 74 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); see also
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The lack of a statutory
definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word
ambiguous . . . .”).
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tiny of one or a few statutory terms in isolation. As the foremost
contemporary exponent of textualism as well as a co-author have observed:
Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to
follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of
the physical and logical relation of its many parts. . . . Context is
a primary determinant of meaning.88
3.

Nontextual Arguments

Loving’s textual orientation was confirmed later in the opinion. The
district court noted that the Government had offered a number of
“nontextual arguments,” but the court rejected their relevance, observing
that “none of these can overcome the statute’s unambiguous text here. In
the land of statutory interpretation, statutory text is king.”89
In fact, both parties offered nontextual arguments, a total of three of
them: (1) the importance of the regulations, (2) legislative history, and
(3) the inconsistency of the Treasury/IRS. These arguments, and their
rejection by the district court, are described below.
a.

Importance of the Regulations

Subpart IIB above described the practical stakes implicated by the
2011 regulatory initiative, and subpart IIC above demonstrated the importance that the Government attaches to it. The Government repeatedly impressed this importance upon the district court.
Nonetheless, the district court—properly in my estimation—rejected
the pertinence of this consideration to the Step One analysis. The court
stated that it did “not gainsay the importance of [the] regulation . . . indeed, it may very well have significant salutary effects . . . . At Chevron Step
One, however, such policy arguments have no relevance.”90
The district court’s approach is consistent with current doctrine. Policy arguments are admissible at Step Two.91 At Step One, however, “con88. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
LEGAL TEXTS 167 (1st ed. 2012); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
89. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
90. Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (stating that policy arguments advanced by parties “are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators,
not to judges”); SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear [that] [p]olicy considerations cannot overrule our interpretation of the text and structure of the [Act].” (second alternation
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704, 715 (2011) (discussing the policy argument of administrability at Step Two).
OF
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siderations of policy divorced from the statute’s text and purpose could
not override its meaning.”92
b.

Legislative History

One might think that—the case having been decided nearly a third of
a century ago—the interpretational questions raised by Chevron would by
now have been resolved. Alas, this is not the case. There are probably
more unsettled questions about Chevron today than there were immediately after its decision.93
An enduring battleground has been whether legislative history is a
proper source in the Step One inquiry. Even textualists acknowledge that
intent is a relevant aspect of statutory interpretation—but an objectified
intent that must be drawn from the enacted statute, not the subjective
intent of legislators.94 They even acknowledge that committee reports
may legitimately be consulted for certain narrow purposes95—but not for
the ascertainment of legislative intent, as purposivists do.
Thus, there is no consistent law on whether legislative history is properly consulted at Step One. The answer given by each case depends upon
the accident of which judge pens the opinion.96 Chevron was authored by
Justice Stevens, a purposivist, so Chevron looked at committee reports at
Step One.97 When textualists write the opinions—as Justice Thomas did
92. United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1731 (2011);
see also Estate of Petter v. Comm’r, 653 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
when text is clear, “public policy cannot save the IRS”).
93. This is one reason that I and others have called for Chevron to be relegated to the dust bin of failed doctrines. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 850–51 (2010); Bryan T. Camp, Interpreting Statutory
Silence, 128 TAX NOTES 501, 507 (2010); Preserving Fairness in Tax, supra note 4, at
281–84; Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
VA. TAX REV. 813 (2013). However, that call is unlikely to be answered by the
courts any time soon. In a recent case, a majority of the Justices made clear their
desire to protect Chevron from interpretations that would lead to its evisceration.
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013).
94. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 16–17 (1997); Steve R. Johnson, The Two Kinds of Legislative Intent, 51
STATE TAX NOTES 1045 (2009).
95. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, at 388 (acknowledging utility of committee reports to establish linguistic usage at time statute was enacted and to refute
attempted application of absurdity doctrine).
96. Compare Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 451–64 (1998), with id. at
464–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
862–64 (1984). In a later case, Justice Stevens took an intermediate view. Finding
that “the plain language of [the] statute appear[ed] to settle the question,” Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, looked to legislative history to ascertain “only
whether there is clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to that language,
which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR304.txt

532

unknown

Seq: 18

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

19-AUG-14

14:36

[Vol. 59: p. 515

in Brand X98 and Chief Justice Roberts did in Mayo99—this aspect of Chevron is conveniently ignored.
In Loving, both parties sought to enlist legislative history. The district
court did not categorically rule such history out of Step One. Instead, the
court found the history of section 330 to be equivocal, and it observed—
consistent with the dominant contemporary view—that it is impermissible
to use “ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory
language.”100
The court was more firm, however, with respect to one aspect of legislative history. On many occasions, bills have been introduced in Congress
to provide explicit authority to Treasury to regulate return preparers not
already covered. All failed.101 These failures could be spun by proponents of the regulations as evidence of their necessity, or by its opponents
as evidence that the 1884 statute does not confer the needed authority.
The district court chose to accord the failed proposals no weight, noting
that “[f]ailed legislative proposals . . . are a particularly dangerous ground
on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”102
c.

Agency Inconsistency

Treasury did not always take the view that the 1884 statute confers
upon it the authority to promulgate rules like those contained in the 2011
regulations. Indeed, for many years, it took the contrary view, both publicly103 and privately.104 The 1966 version of Treasury regulations stated
98. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 989 (2005).
99. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704, 711 (2011).
100. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Milner v.
Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. The plaintiffs count nine such attempts between 2005 and 2013. See
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 12, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 2146603; see, e.g., H.R. 1570, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); S.
3355, 112th Cong. § 202 (2012); H.R. 6050, 112th Cong. § 202 (2012); S. 3215,
111th Cong. § 202 (2010); H.R. 5047, 111th Cong. § 202 (2010); H.R. 1570, S. 832,
109th Cong. § 4 (2005).
102. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (alteration in original) (quoting Cent.
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187
(1994)); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001).
103. See, e.g., Fraud in Income Tax Return Preparation: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 24 (2005) (statement of
Nancy J. Jardini, Chief, IRS Criminal Investigation Division) (“Tax return
preparers are not deemed as individuals who represent individuals before the
IRS . . . .”).
104. For example, Professor Camp reports the view prevalent in the IRS during his time with the IRS was that “it would literally take an act of Congress to fix
the very real problem of unregulated tax return preparers,” a view that he shared
at the time but no longer does. See Bryan T. Camp, “Loving” Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457, 457 (2013) (noting, also, that “both the applicable regulations and the IRS had, for an equally long time, interpreted [the key language of
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expressly: “Neither preparation of a tax return, nor the appearance of an
individual as a witness for the taxpayer, nor the furnishing of information
at the request of the [IRS] or any of its officers or employees is considered
practice before the Service.”105 Should this matter?
The courts have weaved a tangled web as to the significance of agency
inconsistency. In a 1939 case involving the validity of income tax regulations, the Supreme Court discounted the significance of Treasury’s
change of position.106
The principal alternative to Chevron is Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,107 decided in 1944. That case held that the weight a court should give an
agency’s interpretation of a statute in a given case depends on a number
of non-exclusive factors, including the “consistency [of the agency’s current position] with [its] earlier and later pronouncements . . . .”108
The notion resurfaced in a 1979 tax case, National Muffler Dealers
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States.109 Distilling pre-Chevron cases, the Court identified a number of factors bearing on the validity of tax regulations, including “the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation . . . .”110
Taxpayers seized on this comment to argue in many later cases that alleged IRS inconsistency was a reason to deny deference. The better understanding of National Muffler, however, was that IRS consistency is a
reason to accord extra deference, not that its absence is a reason to diminish deference.111 Indeed, the National Muffler Court added: “We would be
reluctant to adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter its interpretation in light of administrative experience.”112
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.113 is a leading case on when agency action is arbitrary and
capricious. The State Farm Court stated that agencies “must be given ample latitude to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances.”114
section 330] to refer only to persons who helped taxpayers in disputes with the
IRS, chiefly attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents”).
105. 31 Fed. Reg. 10773, 10774 (Aug. 13, 1966).
106. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939) (predicting
negative impact on administrative effectiveness and efficiency if Treasury were unable to take flexible approach to regulatory interpretation).
107. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
108. Id. at 140.
109. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
110. Id. at 477; see also Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261
n.17 (1981).
111. See Swallows I, supra note 1, at 364–65 (outlining alternative deferential
approaches to analyzing regulations and arguing that Supreme Court adopted additive deferential approach in National Muffler).
112. Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 485.
113. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
114. Id. at 42 (quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784
(1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Chevron itself involved an agency’s change of position, but the agency
prevailed nonetheless. The Court remarked, “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to
engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”115
However, three years later, Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca.116 This time, the author of Chevron said, “[a]n agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.”117
In 2005, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services118 offered a wrinkle. After confirming that agency inconsistency is
not germane for Chevron purposes, the Court added, “[u]nexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an
arbitrary and capricious change . . . under the Administrative Procedure
Act.”119
The most thorough exploration of agency inconsistency in the context of the arbitrary and capricious standard came in the Court’s 2009 FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.120 decision. The FCC changed its position on
indecent broadcasts. The circuit court found the agency’s action arbitrary
and capricious, in part because the FCC allegedly failed to adequately explain the reasons for the change. A divided Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court. Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, although only three other
Justices joined his opinion in full. Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote
in his concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment. Four Justices dissented.121
The key paragraph in the Court’s opinion laid down four principles:
[1] [T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation . . . would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it
is changing position. . . . [2] And of course the agency must
show that there are good reasons for the new policy. [3] But it
need not demonstrate . . . that the reasons for the new policy are
better than the reasons for the old one . . . . [T]he agency need
not always provide a more detailed justification than what would
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. [4] Sometimes
it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or
115.
(1984).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Id. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)).
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
Id. at 981.
556 U.S. 502 (2009).
Id. at 546.
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when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests . . . .122
Mayo, in 2011, appeared—quite unnecessarily123—to abrogate National Muffler.124 Mayo also rejected the significance of agency inconsistency for Chevron purposes, saying that the Court has “repeatedly held that
‘[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework.’ ”125
Against this background, how did the Loving district court handle
Treasury’s inconsistency as to the scope of its authority under section 330?
The court invoked Brand X’s holding that an agency’s volte-face is irrelevant
for Chevron purposes, as well as Brand X’s dictum that it may be a basis for
holding the agency’s action to be arbitrary and capricious. The district
court avoided that dictum by adding: “While the Court could find no explanation for the IRS’s flip-flop in the new Rule, Plaintiffs have not
claimed here that the IRS was arbitrary and capricious.”126
C.

Definition of “Practice”

Section 330(a)(1) authorized Treasury to “regulate the practice of
representatives of persons before the Department . . . .”127 Central to the
district court’s holding in Loving was its conclusion that the previously unregulated preparers are not engaged in “practice.”
The court began by sketching its conception of the process of IRS
adjudication. The court saw three phases in the following order: assessment and collection, examination, and appeals.128 Phase one reflects the
putative “self-assessment” nature of our tax system.129 Taxpayers file their
returns; the IRS assesses the liabilities reported on those returns; and the
122. Id. at 515 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742
(1996); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974)).
123. See Mayo and the Future, supra note 4, at 1553 (arguing that taxpayers in
Mayo incorrectly applied National Muffler considerations and thus misused case).
124. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
704, 712–14 (2012) (distinguishing between National Muffler and Chevron analyses
of ambiguous statutes and concluding that latter provides appropriate framework
for analyzing relevant rule).
125. Id. at 712 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)) (citing United States v. Eurodif S.A., 129 S. Ct.
878, 887 (2009)).
126. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C. 2013). As noted above,
such a claim has been made in an amici brief to the D.C. Circuit. See supra notes
69–70 and accompanying text.
127. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012).
128. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70.
129. This characterization is widely used. See Brief of Former Comm’rs, supra
note 35, at 7 (showing five former Commissioners of Internal Revenue use this
characterization); Olson, supra note 18, at 771 (showing National Taxpayer Advocate characterizes tax system as one of self-assessment). But see Camp, supra note
104, at 462–66 (maintaining that our system involves self-reporting but not selfassessment). Professor Camp’s position is the more precise.
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IRS deposits the accompanying payments or attempts to collect in the
event of nonpayment.
In phase two, the IRS selects some returns for audit. During the audit, the “taxpayer may be represented . . . by an attorney, certified public
accountant, or other representative.”130 The audit may conclude with an
IRS “no change” letter, a taxpayer concession of additional liabilities, or
disagreement between the taxpayer and the IRS agent.
Phase three resolves any such disagreement. The taxpayers may
choose administrative appeal to the IRS Appeals Office, where they may
“designate a qualified representative to act for them.”131 Absent agreement, the taxpayer may initiate litigation in the Tax Court, district court,
bankruptcy court, or Court of Federal Claims, as appropriate.
The district court acknowledged that section 330(a)(1) does not define “practice of representatives,” but it looked to section 330(a)(2)(D) to
illuminate the phrase’s meaning. That section provides that, before admitting “a representative to practice,” Treasury may require the representative to demonstrate “competency to advise and assist persons in
presenting their cases.”132 On this basis, the district court concluded that
those who merely advise taxpayers as to their returns are not engaged in
“practice” within the contemplation of section 330. It said:
Filing a tax return would never, in normal usage, be described as
“presenting a case.” At the time of filing, the taxpayer has no
dispute with the IRS; there is no “case” to present. This definition makes sense only in connection with those who assist taxpayers in the examination and appeals stages of the process.133
The court rejected two responses by the IRS. First, the Government
argued: “It is nonsensical that Congress would authorize [Treasury] to ensure the competency of those who present ‘cases’ but not those who prepare returns, particularly where only a fraction of prepared returns are
audited and thereafter become ‘cases’ upon appeal before the Service.”134
The Government’s argument is an attempt to invoke the “absurd results”
canon of construction,135 but it does not meet the high bar required by
130. Treas. Reg. § 601.105(b)(1) (1987); see also I.R.C. § 7521(b) (2012) (allowing taxpayer to suspend IRS interview in order to consult with “an attorney,
certified public accountant, enrolled agent, enrolled actuary, or any other person
permitted to represent the taxpayer before the [IRS] . . . .”).
131. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c) (1987).
132. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D) (2012).
133. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
134. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 13, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-0385),
2012 WL 8133440.
135. See generally Steve R. Johnson, The “Absurd Results” Doctrine in State and
Local Tax Cases, 54 STATE TAX NOTES 195 (2009).
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that canon. It is hardly absurd to think that Congress would want to regulate representatives more heavily than advisors.136
Second, the Government contended that section 330(a)(1) is a separate grant of authority from section 330(a)(2)(D), thus the latter does not
limit the former. The court rejected this argument on the basis of the
“same meaning” canon of construction.137 The court noted that the sections are proximate and use the same language. “It is a well established
rule of statutory construction that a word is presumed to have the same
meaning in all subsections of the same statute.”138
“Well established,” yes, but invariable, no. No canon is absolute,139
and in actual practice, courts flout the same meaning canon about as
often as they follow it.140 But adherence is more frequent when, as here,
the provisions were enacted at the same time and were codified in the
same place.141
D.

Wider Context

The terms of a statute “cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”142 This is part of the “classic judicial task of reconciling
many laws enacted over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in combination, [which] necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may
be altered by the implications of a later statute.”143
136. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (“Congress could well desire that those
who represent taxpayers in examinations or appeals be more closely regulated
than those who merely prepare returns.”).
137. See generally Steve R. Johnson, Supertext and Consistent Meaning, 52 STATE
TAX NOTES 675 (2009) (describing same meaning doctrine of construction).
138. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (quoting Allen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 22 F.3d
1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143
(1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the
same way each time it appears.”).
139. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) (rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments for application of statutory canons of construction because “canons are not mandatory rules”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88,
at 59 (addressing principle of interrelating canons).
140. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594–95
(2004) (rejecting argument that multiple uses of same word carried same meaning); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 212 (2001)
(holding that two uses of “wages paid” language had different impacts on benefits
eligibility).
141. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE
AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 776–77 (4th ed. 2005) (distinguishing between supertext and internal context approaches to statutory interpretation).
142. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2012) (quoting
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
143. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
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The Loving district court proceeded in this vein in three respects: (1)
return preparer-specific penalties that would control over general power
to regulate preparers, (2) a disclosure provision that would be expected to
reference the regulatory power, and (3) an injunction provision whose
safeguards would be set at naught by the claimed regulatory power. In my
view, these points have some force but are far from dispositive.
1.

Preparer-Specific Penalties

The district court noted that “Congress ha[d] already enacted a relatively rigid penalty scheme to punish misdeeds by tax-return preparers,” a
scheme consisting of at least ten penalties specific to preparers.144 The
court found this significant for three reasons. First, the court feared that
“if [section] 330 covers tax-return preparers, the IRS would have the discretion—with few restraints—to impose an array of penalties for this sort
of conduct. . . . [This independence] would trample the specific and
tightly controlled penalty scheme in [the Code].”145
Second and third, the court invoked the canons that specific statutes
control over general ones and that highly detailed, comprehensive statutory schemes leave little space for courts to read in additional prescriptions.146 The court observed, “when statutes intersect, the specific statutes
(in Title 26) trump the general ([section] 330). ‘That is particularly true
where . . . Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.’ ”147
These rationales are not overwhelming. The first rationale—circumvention of procedures set out in the ten penalty sections—is undercut by
the second rationale. Since the penalty sections are the more specific sections, the courts could easily hold that the IRS must comply with them,
and not the general authority of section 330, when it seeks to discipline or
penalize return preparers for conduct potentially covered by both section
330 and one or more of the ten penalty sections.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the ten penalty sections form so comprehensive a regulatory scheme as to squeeze out regulation under section
330. The ten sections are purely “back end” remedies, that is, sanctions
after bad conduct has occurred. They do not exclude from practice those
who are most likely (because of inadequate training or other incompetence) to commit bad conduct in the future, as the 2011 regulations
would. It is entirely possible that Congress could want to address the prob144. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 76 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing I.R.C.
§§ 6694(a)–(b), 6695(a)–(d), (f)–(g), 6713, 7216).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 433–34
(2007) (providing example of latter principle in tax area); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349 (1997).
147. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (alteration in original) (quoting RedLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012)).
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lem from both ends, thus that the purely ex post facto penalties do not
rise to the level of a comprehensive scheme.
2.

Disclosure Provision

Section 6103 of the Code establishes a broad principle of confidentiality of tax return information. It also provides many exceptions, situations in which the IRS may disclose some such information. One of the
exceptions is in section 6103(k)(5), which permits the IRS to disclose, to
state and local agencies that license and regulate tax return preparers, the
identities of preparers against whom the sanctions under sections 6694,
6695, or 7216 have been imposed. The district court found it “curious”
that penalties under section 330 were omitted from this list if, as claimed
by the Government, section 330 already authorizes the IRS to penalize
return preparers.148
Well, maybe not so curious. First, in fact, omissions often do occur in
statutes, which is why how to approach the casus omissus has been debated
for centuries149 and why the concept of implied delegation is central to
Chevron.150 Second, the oddity is not unique. One of the ten penalties
identified by the district court is section 6713, yet that section is also omitted from the section 6103(k)(5) list. Third, the relevant Treasury regulations under section 330 were not promulgated until 2011, and so, of
course, no penalties had been imposed. There would be little surprise,
therefore, that section 330 would be under the radar when section
6103(k)(5) was drafted.
3.

Injunction Provision

Under section 7407, upon the occurrence of specified conduct, the
Government may bring an action to enjoin a tax return preparer from
engaging in the conduct or even from acting as a preparer. The district
court stated that, under the Government’s construction of section 330,
Treasury could, by disbarring the preparer, “sidestep every protection
[section] 7407 affords—judicial review, the demanding standards for the
extraordinary remedy of an injunction, and the elevated hurdle for enjoining preparation of tax returns . . . .”151
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Jones v. Smart, [1785] 1 T.R. 44, 52.
150. Chevron held that Congress delegates authority to agencies both by express provisions and by implication from statutory silence. See Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). The Court identified several reasons why Congress may have been silent on a particular matter.
Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance . . . perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and
perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the
question . . . . For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.
Id. at 865.
151. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
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Technically speaking, the Government’s interpretation of section 330
would not render section 7407 surplusage152 because the provisions offer
different remedies: IRS disbarment versus judicial injunction. Nonetheless, the court believed that the easier disbarment route would render section 7407 “pointless” as a practical matter.153
This type of argument goes only so far. It is quite common for legislatures to enact duplicative measures.154 This is no less true in tax than in
other areas. For instance, Congress has often provided the IRS with overlapping, redundant, but nonetheless independent options for collecting
unpaid taxes,155 and the same conduct frequently could be prosecuted
under two or more of the Code’s criminal offense sections.156
Indeed the district court itself acknowledged that section 7408 “might
challenge the Court’s doubt that Congress enacts duplicative statutes” because the injunctive remedy provided by section 7408 largely swallows the
comparable remedy under section 7407.157 After “flagging” this point,
however, the district court declined to pursue it further because the Government had not relied on, or even cited, section 7408.158 The Government does argue section 7408 in its circuit court briefs.159
The district court declined to decide whether any of its textual points
would alone require invalidation of the 2011 regulations. Instead, the
court found: “[T]ogether the statutory text and context unambiguously
foreclose the IRS’s interpretation of [section] 330.”160 Thus, the regulations failed scrutiny at Chevron’s Step One.161
E.

Remedy

Having concluded that the 2011 regulations do not pass muster at
Chevron’s Step One, the district court granted a declaratory judgment that
Treasury lacks the statutory authority to promulgate or enforce the new
152. For discussion of the “no surplusage” precept of construction, see Steve
R. Johnson, The ‘No Surplusage’ Canon in State and Local Tax Cases, 65 STATE TAX
NOTES 793 (2012).
153. See Loving, 917. F. Supp. 2d at 78 (“The Court will not lightly assume that
Congress enacted such a pointless statute.”).
154. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 104 (2008)
(arguing that “the presumptions [underlying the no surplusage canon] simply do
not match political reality”). But see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, at 179 (criticizing Professor Jellum’s contention).
155. The general federal tax lien under section 6321, for example, typically
“swallows” various special tax liens provided by the Code. See DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 352–53 (2d ed.
2008) (discussing general tax lien under section 6321 and supplemental special
tax liens that vary from normal lien rules).
156. See TOWNSEND ET AL., supra note 39, chs. 2A–2B.
157. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
158. See id. at 79.
159. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 31, at 18–19.
160. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 79.
161. See id.
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regulatory scheme. After reviewing the four established conditions, the
court also granted a permanent injunction against Treasury and the IRS
enforcing the new scheme.162 The district court later clarified that the
injunction applies to the regulation’s requirements that preparers (other
than attorneys, certified public accountants, and enrolled agents and actuaries) pay fees unrelated to obtaining PTINs, pass a qualifying examination, and complete annual continuing education. The plaintiffs had not
challenged the requirement that preparers obtain PTINs; thus the injunction does not apply to that requirement.163
The Government asked the district court to stay the injunction pending appeal. The court evaluated this request under a four-factor test: (1)
the likelihood of the Government prevailing on the merits of the appeal,
(2) the likelihood that the Government would be irreparably harmed without a stay, (3) the prospect that others would be harmed by a stay, and (4)
the public interest.164
As to the first factor, the court stated: “Although the Court continues
to believe its decision was correct, it is certainly cognizant that the issue is
one of first impression and raises serious and difficult legal questions.”165
However, finding that the other three factors do not decisively tilt in the
IRS’s favor, the court chose not to lift the injunction pending appeal.166
IV.

THE “PRACTICE” RATIONALE

As seen in subpart IIIC above, a key part of the district court’s rationale was that previously unregulated preparers are not engaged in “practice” within the meaning of section 330. That rationale becomes even
more important in light of the limitations identified in subpart IID above
regarding the court’s other rationales.
Below, I develop the court’s “practice” rationale. Then, in light of a
deeper understanding of what tax returns do, I critique that rationale.
A.

District Court’s Conception of “Practice”

The district court noted that section 330(a)(1) creates no special definition of “practice.”167 In such situations, courts typically “construe a stat162. The four factors for a permanent injunction require a plaintiff to show
that (1) the plaintiff suffered irreparable injury, (2) the remedies available at law
are inadequate, (3) balancing the hardships, an equitable remedy is warranted,
and (4) the public interest would not be disserved. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
163. See Loving, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
164. See Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
165. Loving, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
166. Id. at 112.
167. Id. at 74.
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utory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.”168 But
that does not take us very far in Loving. Legal dictionaries define “practice,” in the sense most obviously pertinent here, as “engag[ing] in a profession”169 or “the pursuit of a profession,”170 which leaves much room for
interpretation.
Fortunately, in the view of the district court, Congress provided additional indication of its intended meaning. The court looked to section
330(a)(2)(D) to provide the definition omitted from section 330(a)(1).
In the court’s estimation, the phrase “advise and assist persons in presenting their cases,” in section 330(a)(2)(D), provides the content of “practice” in section 330(a)(1).171
What, then, does “case” mean? The district court saw “dispute” as
being essential to “case.” At the time a return is filed, the court reasoned,
there is not yet any dispute in existence between the taxpayer and the IRS
as to the taxpayer’s liability for the year covered by the return.172 No dispute, no case, no practice subject to regulation.173
The district court’s approach could be challenged on any of several
grounds: that “practice” is broader than “case,” that dispute is not an essential element of “case,” or that preparing returns is part of a dispute
process. Before evaluating such possible challenges, however, it is important to understand just what tax returns do in our system of taxation.
B.

What Tax Returns Do

To understand the functions of tax returns, take as the paradigm individual income tax returns, which represent by far the largest category of
returns filed with the IRS.174 All individual income tax returns have at
least two elements, and most have a third element as well: (1) always, a
number representing the calculation of the taxpayer’s tax liability for the
year, (2) often, a claim for a refund of the amount by which available
refundable credits exceed that calculated tax liability, and (3) always, nu168. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). This has long been the rule.
See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 451 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“[E]very word . . . is to be expounded
in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground
to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”).
169. DANIEL ORAN, ORAN’S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 373 (3d ed. 2000).
170. JAMES E. CLAPP, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE LAW 335
(2000).
171. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
172. Indeed, there usually is no dispute even later because the IRS accepts
without change the great majority of returns as filed.
173. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
174. In fiscal year 2012, individual income tax returns represented over 60%
of all returns filed with the IRS—about 146 million out of the total of about 237
million. The next largest category, employment tax returns, constituted about
13%, about 30 million returns. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK,
2012 4 (2012) [hereinafter IRS DATA BOOK, 2012].
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merous lines and schedules preceding the “bottom line” liability number
(and any refund number), which provide the information from which the
liability number (and any refund number) was calculated. A document
filed with the IRS that lacks sufficient information from which tax liability
can be computed does not constitute a valid return.175
The second of the above elements—refund claims—deserves amplification. Originally, individual income tax returns were part of a flow of
money that had only one direction: from the taxpayer to the government.
That changed as a result of three events: (1) the evolution of the income
tax from a “class” tax affecting only a small percent of American citizens
into a “mass” tax affecting most adult Americans,176 (2) the enactment of
wage withholding, with excess withholding constituting a refundable
credit claimed via income tax returns,177 and (3) the proliferation of
other refundable credits.
The stories of the first and second of these events are well known.178
The third event and its relationship to Loving are explored in an article by
Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate,179 and an amici brief by former
IRS Commissioners Mortimer Caplin, Sheldon Cohen, Lawrence Gibbs,
Fred Goldberg, and Charles Rossotti,180 from which much of the following
discussion is drawn.
In addition to excess withholding, major refundable credits include
the earned income credit, child credit, medical insurance cost credit, firsttime homebuyer credit, making-work-pay credit, and adoption expense
credit.181 Many of these credits are not intrinsic to the measurement and
taxation of income but rather are conceptually non-tax social welfare or
incentive measures that Congress has chosen to administer through the
income tax apparatus. Return preparers “find themselves on the front
line of administering these programs.”182

175. See Germantown Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1940).
176. Before the start of World War II, only 3% of Americans paid any federal
income tax. That amount rose to 30% by the War’s end and continued to climb in
succeeding decades. See Bruce Bartlett, The Sacrosanct Mortgage Interest Deduction,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
08/061/the-sacrosanct-mortgage-interest-deduction/.
177. See I.R.C. § 6401(b)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402–3(a)(1) (2008).
178. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 9–11 (4th ed. 2012).
179. See Olson, supra note 18.
180. See Brief of Former Comm’rs, supra note 35.
181. For a list of these provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 31, 32, 24(d)(1), 35, 36, 36A,
and 23, respectively. Refundable credit claims represented over 36% of 2011 refund claims. See Olson, supra note 18, at 777 (citing IRS data).
182. Brief of Former Comm’rs, supra note 35, at 5.
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In 2012, over 82% of filed individual income tax returns resulted in
payment of a refund.183 Total refunds paid exceeded $322 billion, an average of nearly $2,700 per return claiming a refund.184
Because many of the refundable credits—as well as other features of
the Code, including many exclusions, deductions, and nonrefundable
credits—are “hideously complex, return preparation is anything but
straightforward”185 and is beyond the abilities of most taxpayers. As a
result:
If you hold yourself out to the public as a tax return preparer,
you are not a mere scrivener. You are in the business of advising
and assisting your client, the taxpayer, on the treatment of her
items of income and expense under the tax code, and on her
eligibility for government benefits that are delivered through the
tax code. It is your judgment and your knowledge that enable you
to make that entry on the return on behalf of the taxpayer.186
Thus, Taxpayer Advocate Olson maintains, “[u]nlike in 1884 . . . or
1982 (when the 1884 statute was ‘stylistically’ rewritten), return preparers
today are the intermediaries between taxpayers and their government for
most individual and business taxpayers,” and “[t]he definition of representative must keep up with the programs and policies Congress has chosen
to administer through today’s tax code.”187
I am somewhat uneasy with the above argument. There is an ongoing
debate in statutory interpretation between dynamists who believe that
courts should update old statutes in light of changed conditions188 and
textualists who believe that “legal texts must be given the meaning they
bore when adopted,” and “we do not allow courts to ‘update’ them.”189
I am more in sympathy with the latter viewpoint. If the meaning of
the statute can expand because Congress laces the Code with non-revenue
provisions, it presumably would contract should Congress later move those
183. IRS DATA BOOK, 2012, supra note 174, at 6. The number of people receiving tax refunds (about 120 million) is almost double the number receiving
payments from the Social Security Administration (about 62 million). SSA,
MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, FEB. 2013 tbl.1 (2013), available at http://
www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2013-02.html.
184. See IRS DATA BOOK, 2012, supra note 174, at 19. For a breakdown of the
numbers and amounts of refunds claimed for 2011 for six of the largest refundable
credits, see Olson, supra note 18, at 776 tbl.1 (giving statistics from IRS Compliance Data Warehouse).
185. Olson, supra note 18, at 767.
186. Id. at 770.
187. Id. at 771.
188. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 9 (1940) (describing a statute
as “not something that is, but something that becomes; it is not a hard chunk of
reality, but a fluid process”).
189. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, at 403–04.
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provisions out of the Code, transferring them to other agencies or repealing them entirely. Statutes should be imbued with greater stability.
Despite this uneasiness, there is some pedigree for the evolutionary
approach. For instance, the Supreme Court’s iconic Bob Jones University v.
United States190 decision was based on a static statute which was allowed to
“evolve” to reflect changing public policy.191
C.
1.

Critique of District Court’s Conception

Is Dispute Necessary?

As seen in subpart IVA above, the district court defined “practice” in
terms of presenting a “case” and saw an extant dispute as essential to the
existence of a “case.” It is understandable for a federal judge to think so,
steeped as such a magistrate is in the “case and controversy” limitation on
his or her jurisdiction.192
But is dispute an indispensable ingredient of “case”? Dictionaries are
not the be-all and end-all for legal definitions—the perils of dictionary
shopping are well known193—but they are relevant to the exercise.
Legal dictionaries and related works often give dispute or controversy
as an attribute of either “case” or its near relatives—often synonyms194—
“cause,” “action,” and “suit.”195 But an approximately equal number define these terms without reference to dispute or controversy. The alternative definitions include “grounds,”196 “right to sue,”197 “all proceedings
with respect to a . . . claim,”198 and “[t]he legal theory of the party.”199
190. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
191. However, the Bob Jones Court cautioned that its approach should be used
sparingly. See id. at 592.
192. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (defining power of judiciary). This is the
textual basis, for example, of the inability of federal judges to render advisory opinions. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968).
193. One dictionary may offer multiple definitions of the key word, many dictionaries have gone through multiple editions, and there are numerous competing
dictionaries. All this gives judges wide opportunity to manipulate results. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, app.; Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Note, Looking It
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
194. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 139 (2d ed.
2001) (noting that differentiation between case and cause “if it does exist at all . . .
is little heeded”); DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 9 (1992) (“[A]ction is interchangeable with case, lawsuit, and suit . . . .”).
195. See BALLENTINE’S LEGAL DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 142 (1995); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 243 (9th ed. 2009); GARNER, supra note 194, at 142; ORAN, supra
note 169, at 79.
196. WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S LEGAL THESAURUS 73 (3d ed. 1998).
197. MELLINKOFF, supra note 194, at 9.
198. CLAPP, supra note 170, at 71.
199. IRWIN ALTERMAN, PLAIN AND ACCURATE STYLE IN COURT PAPERS 172
(1987). But see GARNER, supra note 194, at 139 (describing this use as “nonsense”).
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The reference above to “claim” is significant in light of the genesis of
section 330. As shown in subpart IIA above, the provision originated in
1884, and the current (1982) revision was intended to effect only stylistic,
not substantive, changes. The 1884 version referred to the representation
of “claimants,” those who make claims. The dictionaries are virtually
unanimous that “claim” means “an assertion that one is entitled to something,”200 or “[t]he aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”201 This also was the meaning understood around
the time the original version of section 330 was enacted.202
As described in subpart IVB above, tax returns assert the taxpayer’s
calculated liability and, in most cases, their demand for a specified refund
for which the taxpayer will be entitled to sue if not paid by the IRS.203
These sound like claims, rights to sue, and assertions of entitlement as
used above. The filing of the returns could be viewed as a proceeding with
respect to the claims.204
Tax returns also contain numerous lines and schedules providing the
information from which the liability and refund amounts were computed.
These sound like the taxpayer’s grounds, legal theory, or the aggregate of
operative facts giving rise to the taxpayer’s enforceable right.205
2.

Is Dispute Present?

Another possible avenue of attack would be to accept the district
court’s premise that dispute is necessary but to maintain that dispute is
present as to prepared returns, either potentially or actually. In taking this
position, Taxpayer Advocate Olson offers three perspectives. First, “tax
return filing has always been a somewhat adversarial act because the taxpayer holds all the information and gets to decide (at her own risk) how
much she will tell the tax agency.”206
Second, the sweep and complexity of the income “tax system almost
guarantee that every return has an error in it—some inadvertent, some
200. CLAPP, supra note 170, at 84; see also BALLENTINE’S LEGAL DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS, supra note 195, at 101; GARNER, supra note 194, at 159; MELLINKOFF,
supra note 194, at 81; ORAN, supra note 169, at 90.
201. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 195, at 81–82; MELLINKOFF, supra
note 194, at 81; ORAN, supra note 169, at 90.
202. See Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 575 (1886) (“What is a claim against
the United States is well understood. It is a right to demand money from the
United States.”); see also Milliken v. Barrow, 65 F. 888 (C.C.E.D. La. 1895), aff’d, 74
F. 612 (5th Cir. 1896).
203. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 195, at 281.
204. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2012) (prohibiting suit for refund unless preceded
by claim for refund).
205. It would be no answer to say that not all returns make refund claims. All
preparers prepare some refund returns and some non-refund returns. As long as a
preparer prepared some refund claims, the preparer would be engaged in “practice” under the above line of reasoning.
206. Olson, supra note 18, at 771.
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intentional.”207 Indeed, the “law has evolved so that competently advising
a taxpayer and accurately preparing even the simplest return require an
extraordinary exercise of judgment and knowledge by the return
preparer.”208
Third, the position taken on the return “constitutes the opening volley in making [the taxpayer’s] case,” part of the “annual conversation with
the federal government.”209 After the return has been submitted, but
before it is accepted into the system, the IRS subjects the return to substantial error review and pre-screening, especially when the return claims a
refund. These activities are not counted as audits. When these steps are
taken into account, the audit rate rises from the officially announced rate
of around 1%210 to about 7.5%.211 From this perspective, the bulk of the
IRS’s compliance checks—arguably controversy “cases”—occur outside
traditional examination and collection.212 Based on modern IRS processing procedures, Professor Camp concludes: “Far from being automatically
accepted as filed, all filed returns must make a prima facie case that they
are correct. . . . Tax returns do, in a very real sense, present a case before
the IRS as to what should be assessed.”213
The perspectives above represent independent challenges to the district court’s “practice” rationale. Dispute might or might not be an essential component of “case” and thus “practice.” If it is, dispute might or
might not be present in sufficient degree in the return preparation, filing,
and processing system. Both of these propositions are debatable.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE—“REPRESENTATIVE”
A. “Representative”

The questionable nature of the rationales offered by the district court
does not mean that Loving was wrongly decided. Appellate courts review
the holdings, not the reasoning, of lower courts.214 Accordingly, it has
long been “the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court,
it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”215
207. Id.
208. Id. at 771–72.
209. Id. at 772.
210. See IRS DATA BOOK, 2012, supra note 174, at 22.
211. See Olson, supra note 18, at 773.
212. See id.
213. Camp, supra note 104, at 463, 465. Professor Camp’s painstaking historical elaboration makes his article, along with Taxpayer Advocate Olson’s, mustreads for those interested in Loving.
214. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937).
215. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The courts are “reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law with
broad implications . . . that were not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation . . . .” Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 438 (2005). However, the “representa-
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I believe there is an alternative rationale that provides a sounder basis
for the district court’s holding. That rationale trenches on other language
in section 330. Section 330(a)(1) authorizes regulation of “the practice of
representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury.”216
Thus, even if there is “practice,” it is not subject to regulation unless it is
the practice of a “representative.” The centrality of “representative” to the
statutory scheme is underlined by the fact that the term (or a form of it)
appears in four other places in the statute217 and appeared in the original,
1884 version.218
The sources are in virtually universal agreement that, in the sense relevant here, to represent is “to act for another, as an agent or attorney
does; to stand in the place of another; to speak for another,”219 and that a
representative is “[o]ne who stands for or acts on behalf of another.”220
One who prepares the return of another, without more, is not acting,
standing, or speaking for the taxpayer. Taxpayer Advocate Olson is surely
correct in saying that taxpayers typically do not understand the tax law
themselves and so rely on the expertise and advice of their preparers.221
But that does not alter the fact that the return is the taxpayer’s.222 A form
signed by the taxpayer, but not the preparer, is a valid return; a form
signed by the preparer, but not the taxpayer, is not a valid return.223
Thus, the preparer cannot act on behalf of the taxpayer in submitting a
return.
The preparer-client situation in Loving is distinguishable from the attorney-client relationship in Commissioner v. Banks.224 In Banks, the taxpaytive” issue was raised by the plaintiffs from the start. See Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 55–58, Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013)
(No. 12-0385), 2012 WL 5356606.
216. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012).
217. See id. § 330(a)(2), (a)(2)(C), (b), (b)(4).
218. See Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 28 Stat. 236, 258 (“representing of
claimants”).
219. BALLENTINE’S LEGAL DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, supra note 195, at
575–76.
220. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 195, at 1416; see also CLAPP, supra
note 170, at 372; MELLINKOFF, supra note 194, at 555; ORAN, supra note 169, at 418.
221. See Olson, supra note 18, at 771–72 (observing complex evolution of tax
law has resulted in reliance on expertise of tax preparers).
222. See Camp, supra note 104, at 468 (arguing that return preparers are not
agents or representatives of their clients). Professor Camp and I agree that “representative” is the best argument against the 2011 regulations. See id. at 462–64 (providing support for assertion that representative is best argument). He, however,
believes the argument ultimately fails, while I believe that it succeeds. See id. at
466–69 (concluding that representative argument fails). For a discussion of his
objections to the argument, see infra notes 228–42.
223. See I.R.C. §§ 6061, 6064–65 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012–1(a)(5) (2012).
224. Compare Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (seeking above-the-line
deductions for contingent fees paid to attorneys), with Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp.
2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that preparer is not authorized to act on behalf of
taxpayer-client).
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ers, successful plaintiffs in tort actions, sought above-the-line deductions
for contingent fees paid to their attorneys.225 On the basis of the assignment-of-income doctrine, the Supreme Court disagreed, relegating the
taxpayers to less desirable below-the-line deductions. In rejecting an alternative argument for the taxpayers, the Court stated:
We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax
purposes. The relationship between client and attorney . . . is a
quintessential principal-agent relationship. . . . The client may
rely on the attorney’s expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of
most principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact
that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the
underlying claim. . . . Even where the attorney exercises independent judgment without supervision by, or consultation with,
the client, the attorney, as an agent, is obligated to act solely on
behalf of, and for the exclusive benefit of, the client-principal,
rather than for the benefit of the attorney or any other party.226
In the context discussed by Banks, the attorney is authorized to act,
and does act, on behalf of the plaintiff-client. In the Loving context, however, the preparer is not authorized to act, and does not act, on behalf of
the taxpayer-client. The attorney is empowered to start the case and take
other significant action via documents signed by him alone. The client
makes the decisions, of course, but the lawyer has the power to execute
them. In contrast, the preparer qua preparer lacks this power. It is the
taxpayer’s execution, not the preparer’s, that makes the filed document
legally operative as a tax return.227
B.

Counterarguments Considered

Presumably because it was not the focus of the district court’s opinion, the “representative” question received scant attention from the Government on appeal. The totality of the treatment of the question in its
initial brief to the D.C. Circuit was the following half sentence in a footnote: “There can be no serious dispute that paid tax-return preparers are
‘representatives of persons’ . . . .”228
Plainly, a more substantial rejoinder is needed. Commentators and
officials have offered four: (1) preparers routinely communicate with the
IRS after filing; (2) Treasury regulation has progressively and substantially
225. See Banks, 543 U.S. at 426 (providing facts).
226. Id. at 436.
227. See Olpin v. Comm’r, 270 F.3d 1297, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2001), aff’g 78
T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1999) (holding that “return” signed by tax preparer but not
taxpayers is invalid even if taxpayers intended document to be their return).
228. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 31, at 14 n.11.
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expanded; (3) preparers have limited appearance rights; and (4) purposively, the current situation is comparable to the situation prompting the
1884 legislation. These arguments are considered below.
1.

Routine Communication

The National Taxpayer Advocate points out that, after their clients’
returns are filed, “preparers call the IRS constantly inquiring about the
status of these returns. In short, they have cases before the IRS and they
are advocating on behalf of their clients’ claims.”229
But inquiring when the IRS is likely to send out the refund is qualitatively different from urging the merits of the claim. The latter is substantive. The former is ministerial.230
2.

History of Expansion

Professor Camp carefully develops the history of regulation of practitioners under Treasury Circular 230, including modifications between
1884 and 1921, between 1921 and 1966, in 1984, in 1994, in 2004, and in
2007.231 He concludes: “What Treasury has done over time is expand the
term ‘practice’ beyond simply the representational behavior of ‘representatives of persons.’ . . . The term ‘practice’ now includes nonrepresentational behavior—such as preparing returns and rendering written tax
advice—as long as that behavior is engaged in by representatives of
persons.”232
As described in subpart IIB above, some of the policy concerns about
the regulation are intrusion and regulatory overkill. The dramatic expansion of Treasury’s asserted authority under Circular 230—particularly in
the last two decades—suggests that there may be substance to these
concerns.
Moving beyond policy, there are three reasons why I believe the above
history does not legitimize the 2011 regulations. First, usurpation is not its
own justification. The fact that an agency expands its self-proclaimed
power does not make such arrogations legitimate. This is especially so
because the most aggressive assertions under Circular 230 came, not in the
first 100 years after the 1884 legislation, but only comparatively recently,
within the last twenty years.
Second, although courts sometimes consider post-enactment administrative behavior as one factor bearing on interpreting a statute, Part VI
229. Olson, supra note 18, at 775.
230. Cf. S. REP. NO. 94-354, at 37 (1975) (discussing when request for status
report can constitute an ex parte communication prohibited by APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(d)).
231. See Camp, supra note 104, at 457–62 (“I do not present the history of
Circular 230 as a strictly legal or doctrinal argument favoring regulation . . . . My
intention is to simply explain how the decision to regulate return preparers is
more consistent than inconsistent with the past.”).
232. Id. at 462.
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puts this and related factors together in the context of a Brown & Williamson analysis. As shown in Part VI, the totality of that analysis militates
against the validity of the 2011 regulations, or at a minimum offsets the
Circular 230 historical analysis.
Third, the most pertinent event in the Circular 230 history is the 1984
episode. In 1984, as part of the government’s ongoing war against tax
shelters, Treasury amended sections 10.2(a) and 10.33 of Circular 230 to
assert—for the first time—authority to control opinion writing by attorneys and certified public accountants.233
Professor Camp agrees that under a narrow reading of section 330(a),
the 1984 change “was overreaching.”234 However, Congress sanctioned
that change. It enacted section 330(d) to provide:
Nothing in [section 330] or in any other provision of law shall be
construed to limit the authority of the [ ] Treasury to impose
standards applicable to the rendering of written advice . . . of a
type which the [Treasury] determines as having a potential for
tax avoidance or evasion.235
The 1984 tax shelter opinion change was the only expansion of Circular 230 that Congress specifically ratified. Congress did not see fit to enact
comparable provisions blessing other expansions of Circular 230. This episode points to the correct path in Loving. If Congress wishes, it can legitimate Treasury’s approach by enacting confirming legislation, as Congress
did in 1984 regarding section 330(d). Absent such legitimation, the naked assertion of administrative power should not be sustained.
3.

Limited Appearance Rights

Section 10.7 of Circular 230 created limited practice rights for return
preparers. With respect to returns they have prepared, they are allowed to
“appear without enrollment as the taxpayer’s representative . . . before
revenue agents and examining officers” of the IRS Examination
Division.236
The Government does not emphasize this provision in Loving. Properly so. One could understand Treasury, based on section 330, regulating
preparers who actually do represent clients during audits under section
10.7. But most return preparers do not exercise this privilege. The section should not be used as a cat’s paw to sweep into the regulatory net the
numerous return preparers who never act as representatives.
233. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
234. Camp, supra note 104, at 460.
235. 31 U.S.C. § 330(d) (2012).
236. Camp, supra note 104, at 459 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Comparable Purposes

As shown in subpart IIA above, Congress enacted the original version
of section 330 because of misconduct by unscrupulous attorneys and
claims agents.237 Likening current incompetence and dishonesty to that
earlier misconduct, the National Taxpayer Advocate maintains: “Today’s
tax system, with its industry of preparers, closely resembles the circumstances in 1884 when Congress sought to impose order on the process of
filing claims before Treasury.”238
If the analogy holds, this argument could be persuasive to judges who
accept purpose as a legitimate part of the Chevron Step One inquiry. I
think, though, that the situations are distinguishable in three respects.
First, the 1880s claims agents actually appeared before Treasury officials;239 mere return preparers do not. Second, claimants in the 1880s
often conveyed their claims to the representatives;240 taxpayers do not
convey their tax refund claims to their return preparers—indeed they are
legally prohibited from doing so by the Anti-Assignment Act.241 Third, in
the 1880s, rival agents and attorneys often made conflicting claims on
Treasury;242 there is no indication that something of the same nature is a
problem now. The proffered analogy does not fit with much precision.
VI. BROWN & WILLIAMSON
The Supreme Court’s 2000 Brown & Williamson decision is an important case for Chevron, general administrative law, and statutory interpretation.243 The district court’s Loving opinion cited Brown & Williamson
twice.244 In my view, however, that case should play a larger role in the
current controversy.
There are differences between Brown & Williamson and Loving to be
sure, but there are meaningful similarities as well. Below, I describe Brown
& Williamson, then note its application to Loving.
237. For a further discussion of the reasons Congress enacted the original
version of section 330, see supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text.
238. Olson, supra note 18, at 775.
239. See George Maurice Morris, Growth and Regulation of the Treasury Bar, 8
A.B.A. J. 742, 742 (1922) (observing that claims agents appeared before Treasury
officials).
240. See id. (“As the result of the conveyance by claimants of their claims to
their representatives questions began to arise between such claimants and their
agents . . . .”).
241. See Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b) (2012) (restricting who can
receive assignment).
242. See Morris, supra note 239, at 742.
243. See generally FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
244. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75, 77 (D.D.C. 2013) (standing for
proposition that ambiguous words can be clarified by context and idea that meaning of one statute may be clarified by other statutes, especially ones subsequently
enacted and more specific).

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR304.txt

2014]

unknown

LOVING

AND

A.

Seq: 39

LEGITIMACY

19-AUG-14

14:36

553

The Case

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “Act”) grants the Food and
Drug Administration authority to regulate, inter alia, “drugs” and “devices.”245 In 1996, after having long disclaimed having authority to do so,
the FDA asserted jurisdiction under the Act to regulate tobacco products,
and it promulgated regulations to do so. By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court invalidated the regulations under Chevron’s Step One.
The majority stated that, at Step One, “a reviewing court should not
confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.”246
It should consider, as well, other related statutes, “particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at
hand.”247 In addition, the court “must be guided to a degree by common
sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy
decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency.”248
The Court reached its Step One conclusion on the basis of several
considerations. One was the Act taken as a whole.249 By itself, however,
this likely would have been insufficient, especially because, as noted by the
dissent, the statutory language—read literally—seemed to countenance
the regulations.250 Thus, looming large to the outcome were the four
reinforcing rationales discussed below: (1) the pattern of subsequent legislation, (2) the FDA’s repeated disavowal of the authority it eventually asserted in 1996, (3) Congress’s rejection of bills that would have clearly
conferred the authority, and (4) the expectation that Congress will make
particularly important decisions itself rather than delegate them to an
agency.
1.

Pattern of Subsequent Legislation

The Brown & Williamson majority noted that, over a thirty-five year
period after passage of the Act, Congress had enacted six separate pieces
of legislation addressing tobacco use and human health, the “collective
premise” of which was that tobacco products would continue to be sold in
245. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)–(h), 393 (2012).
246. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132.
247. Id. at 133. The Court has not been consistent as to nuance. In contrast
to Brown & Williamson’s “especially” language, the Court in the same year said that
courts should “interpret the text of one statute in the light of text of surrounding
statutes, even those subsequently enacted.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786 n.17 (2000) (emphasis added) (calling this
principle “well established”); see also United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S.
517, 530–31 (1998) (“[A] specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should
control our construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been
expressly amended.”).
248. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.
249. See id. at 142.
250. See id. at 162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the United States.251 Although the text of the Act could, at the time of its
enactment, have been plausibly interpreted to allow regulation or even
prohibition of tobacco products, the subsequent legislation had narrowed
the range of plausibility, excluding that possibility.252
I have never been entirely sure why this should be so. As seen earlier,
textualists—and the five Justices in the majority in Brown & Williamson
were usually considered textualists—typically insist that the meaning of
language at the time the statute is enacted should control.253 And the
reenactment and inaction canons254 are usually (and properly) considered weak,255 in part because the views of subsequent legislatures should
not be attributed to the enacting legislature. Also, when a later statute
does not purport to amend or abrogate a prior statute, there is a strong
presumption against repeal by implication.256
Why then should later statutes influence the construction of earlier
statutes? One reason seems to be courtesy to a coordinate branch of government. Courts presume that legislatures pass laws “with deliberation,
and with full knowledge of existing ones on the same subject . . . .”257 Of
course, “[t]he legislative omniscience assumed by this explanation is fanciful,”258 but Anglo-American law would be unrecognizable without fictions.
It is polite to assume that Congress’s actions, even over time, are cohesive.
Additionally, courts believe that it is part of their function to provide
stability and assist the governed to understand the commands of the sovereign. Thus:
251. See id. at 139, 143 (majority opinion).
252. See id. at 143 (“Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus
those meanings.”).
253. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)
(“It is a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior
statute when it concerns, as it does here, a proposal that does not become law.”);
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Arguments based on subsequent legislative history . . . should not be taken seriously,
not even in a footnote.”); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1986)
(stating that views of subsequent legislators have “very little, if any, significance”);
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968) (“The view of a subsequent
Congress of course [can] provide no controlling basis from which to infer the
purposes of an earlier Congress.”).
254. See generally Steve R. Johnson, The Reenactment and Inaction Doctrines in
State Tax Litigation, 50 STATE TAX NOTES 661 (2008) (providing general discussion
of reenactment and inaction doctrines).
255. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–02 (1983) (stating that these canons are usually disfavored but finding special reasons to apply
them in case at hand).
256. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
141–42 (2001) (“[T]he only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is
when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974))).
257. Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 62 (Idaho 1969); see also Steve R. Johnson, The Judicial Instinct to Harmonize Statutes, 57 STATE TAX NOTES 599 (2010) (discussing judges’ inclination to reach results that harmonize statutory meanings).
258. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 88, at 328.
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Where a statutory term . . . is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently
enacted law. We do so not because that precise accommodative
meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind (how
could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.259
2.

Agency’s Prior Disavowal of Authority

In a brief filed in a 1980 case, the FDA stated: “In the 73 years since
the enactment of the original [Act] . . . the FDA has repeatedly informed
Congress that cigarettes are beyond the scope of the statute . . . .”260 In
light of the importance and visibility of the issue, the Court thought it
inconceivable that Congress was unaware of these prior agency
statements.261
In light of the Court’s frequent previous statements discounting the
significance of agency inconsistency,262 the Brown & Williamson majority
did not say that the FDA’s former statements were themselves controlling.
Instead, “[t]he consistency of the FDA’s prior position is significant . . . for
a different reason: It provides important context to Congress’s enactment
of its tobacco-specific legislation . . . [which] has effectively ratified the
FDA’s previous position that it lacks the jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco.”263
3.

Rejected Bills

The Brown & Williamson majority noted that Congress had considered
and rejected bills that would have granted the FDA the authority it asserted for its invalidated regulations.264 As the Loving district court noted,
the Court in other cases has downplayed the significance of such behavior
as a guide to statutory interpretation.265
259. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991) (citation
omitted).
260. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 146 (2000)
(quoting Brief for Appellee (FDA) at 14–15, Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (No. 79-1397)).
261. See id. at 156 (concluding that in light of circumstances, it was “hardly
conceivable that Congress . . . was not abundantly aware of what was going on”).
This is similar to what the Court observed about Congress’s knowledge of the IRS’s
position on tax exemption of racially discriminatory schools. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–02 (1983).
262. See supra notes 103–26.
263. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 156–57.
264. See id. at 144 (explaining Congress’s considerations).
265. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR304.txt

556

unknown

Seq: 42

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

19-AUG-14

14:36

[Vol. 59: p. 515

What made the Brown & Williamson context different? In United States
v. Rodgers,266 an important tax collection case, the Court discounted the
significance of Congress’s failure to enact a bill, concluding that the reason for non-enactment was more likely that Congress viewed the bill as
unnecessary (because the IRS already possessed the power in question)
than as undesirable (because the IRS should not have that power).267
That could not have been the reason for the failure of the tobacco regulation bills. With the FDA consistently stating that it lacked the regulatory
authority, Congress could not have concluded that the bills were superfluous, making more probable the inference that Congress, in rejecting the
bills, wished to keep the authority out of the FDA’s hands.
4.

Major Question

There is a debate about whether there is and should be a “major question” exception to judicial deference to agencies.268 There is some judicial support for a strong form of the rule: major policy choices should be
made by Congress, not by agencies.269 There is substantial judicial support for a weaker form of the rule: it is presumed that Congress intends to
address major questions itself and that only unambiguous statutory language will persuade a court that Congress intended to delegate resolution
of such questions to an agency.270
Commentators continue to discuss both the scope and the wisdom of
“major question” rules.271 However, many Justices embraced the weak
form in a fairly recent tax decision,272 and the Court adopted an important rationale behind the rules in an even more recent non-tax case.273
266. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
267. See id. at 702 n.31.
268. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exceptions to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008).
269. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“It is the hard choices, and not the filling
in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected representatives of the people.
When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be
enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress and the President insofar as
he exercises his constitutional role in the legislative process.”).
270. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.44 (2001); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
271. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Elephants, Mouse Holes, Non-Barking Dogs, and
Statutory Interpretation, 64 STATE TAX NOTES 911 (2012); Preserving Fairness in Tax,
supra note 4, at 304–07; Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in
Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
272. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842
(2011); see also Johnson, supra note 5.
273. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013) (“[C]oncerns
about agency self-aggrandizement are at their apogee . . . in cases where an
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The Brown & Williamson majority linked the “major questions” doctrine to Chevron’s notion that a statutory gap may be an implicit delegation
of authority to the agency. It stated: “In extraordinary cases, [ ] there may
be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such
an implicit delegation.”274 And it offered the following—the weak form of
the doctrine—apparently as an example: “A court may also ask whether
the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have
focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial
matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.”275 Applying this to tobacco regulation, the Court stated: “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”276
There is an epilogue. By the time Brown & Williamson had worked its
way through the courts, “Congress had enacted limited versions of most of
FDA’s major initiatives” regulating tobacco.277 Then, in 2009, Congress
enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Control Act, conferring upon
the FDA broad authority to regulate tobacco products.278
B.

Application to Loving

As seen in subpart IIIB, the Loving district court conducted the Step
One inquiry in an exacting fashion, not stopping at the fact that section
330(a)(1) had not defined “practice of representatives.”279 Instead, it enlisted other portions of the statute, as well as other statutes, to reach its
conclusion that Congress had unambiguously withheld the authority asserted by Treasury and the IRS.
Brown & Williamson reflects the same kind of approach. The literal
language of the statute at issue supported the agency, but the majority did
not stop there. The majority found the literal language to be overridden
by a combination of contextual clues.
Giving greater attention to Brown & Williamson bolsters the Loving
plaintiffs’ cause in four ways: (1) providing a stronger framework for the
district court’s context and “wider context” points, (2) creating some
purchase for potential arguments the district court discounted, (3) laying
agency’s expansive construction of the extent of its own power would have
wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”).
274. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
275. Id. (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
276. Id. at 160 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tele. & Tele. Co., 512
U.S. 218, 231 (1994)).
277. Moncrieff, supra note 268, at 627 (identifying different versions).
278. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Jeremy R. Singer, Note and Comment,
Taking on Tobacco: The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 34 NOVA L.
REV. 539, 539–40 (2010) (providing historical background).
279. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73–75 (D.D.C. 2013) (conducting
analysis under Chevron’s Step One).
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a foundation for a strong-form major-question argument, and (4) suggesting a favorable tie-breaker via a weak-form major-question argument.
Below, I discuss the first and second of these possibilities together, then
the third and fourth together.
1.

Wider Context and Discounted Arguments

The Brown & Williamson majority did not treat any one indicator as
dispositive. Instead, it wove several threads together to form the contextual tapestry it found decisive: the statute as a whole, other statutes enacted subsequent to the statute at issue, the FDA’s prior and contrary
position—surely known to Congress—that it lacked the authority in question, and Congress’s rejection of bills that would have conferred the authority the FDA said it lacked under existing legislation.
Each of these elements arguably exists in Loving as well: the statute as
a whole (the district court reading section 330(a)(1) in light of section
330(a)(2)(D)),280 other subsequent statutes (the ten preparer penalties,
the disclosure statute, and the injunction statute),281 the agency’s denial
of authority (including in testimony given by the IRS to Congress),282 and
Congress’s rejection of bills that would have conferred on the Treasury/
IRS the authority it originally said it lacked under section 330.283
Deploying these arguments in a Brown & Williamson analysis would
strengthen the arguments—context of the statute and wider context—that
the district court did employ. Part III noted that these points have some
cut when based solely on various canons of construction but that their cut
is limited by certain weaknesses. These points would have greater force
when grounded on both traditional canons and Brown & Williamson.
In addition, the district court chose not to enlist Treasury/IRS’s inconsistency and Congress’s rejection of potentially empowering bills. That
rejection is understandable based on precedents as to such things taken in
isolation. But adopting a Brown & Williamson framework could allow these
rejected points to be considered as part of a meta-contextual analysis.
I do not maintain that the Loving circumstances map with perfect congruence onto the Brown & Williamson circumstances. For instance, the six
subsequent tobacco-specific statutes strike me as closer in subject matter to
the Food and Drug Act than the preparer penalty, disclosure, and injunction sections are to section 330. Further, the FDA’s disavowals of jurisdiction were more frequent and visible than the IRS’s disavowals of
jurisdiction. Thus, the meta-context in Brown & Williamson is stronger
than the meta-context in Loving.284
280. See supra notes 127–41 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 142–61 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 103–26 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
284. And even the Brown & Williamson meta-context persuaded only five of
the nine Justices.
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But if Loving is “Brown & Williamson lite,” it is more “Brown & Williamson” than “lite.” That is, although there is some difference in degree or
intensity, the similarities between the two cases remain striking. Serious
development of Brown & Williamson and its comparability to Loving would,
I believe, bolster the Loving result.
2.

“Major Question” Arguments

The Loving district court stated that the importance of the initiative is
irrelevant at Step One of Chevron.285 Brown & Williamson takes the same
tack. The dissent in that case offered that “the statute’s basic purpose—
the protection of public health—supports the inclusion of cigarettes
within its scope.”286 The majority rejoined that, “[i]n our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take
care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop.”287
But this attains yet more strength when put in a Brown & Williamson
major-question context. By a rhetorical ju-jitsu, the more significant the
return preparer regulation project—the more preparers involved, the
more clients affected, and the bigger the dollar stakes—the more the
plaintiffs can argue, first, that the matter is so significant that Congress,
not Treasury, should create the regulatory scheme (strong form) or, second, that the courts should find that Congress delegated that authority to
Treasury only upon the clearest textual evidence (weak form).
Of the two, the weak-form version stands the better chance of winning
judicial acceptance. One of the problems with the major-question approach is the absence of readily manageable judicial standards: at what
point does a question become important enough to trigger the doctrine?288 That is a bigger concern when applying the strong form. The
weak form is a species of the well-known and often invoked “plain statement” principle of statutory interpretation,289 and line-drawing difficulties
285. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
286. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 162 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out FDA’s findings that unregulated tobacco use
causes over 400,000 deaths annually and that tobacco products kill more people
than AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires
combined).
287. Id. at 161 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Article of Drug,
Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 800 (1969)).
288. Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868–70 (2013) (rejecting
distinguishing between “the big, important [interpretations]” and “humdrum, runof-the-mill stuff” in part because of difficulty of drawing line separating two categories); see also Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing manageable standards in
context of nondelegation doctrine).
289. When a particular interpretation of a statute would compromise important substantive principles (here, that the legislature should make the big calls),
courts typically accept the interpretation only if the statute contains a plain, unambiguous statement that the legislature intended to do so. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo.
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do not seem to have deterred courts very often from invoking that
principle.
The district court properly acknowledged that Loving presents “serious and difficult legal questions.”290 A tie-breaking principle such as
Brown & Williamson’s weak-form, major-question approach might present
a tempting way to resolve the case in favor of the plaintiffs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There always are two questions in law: desirability and legitimacy. The
desirability question is whether the outcome sought by a party would be a
wise result as measured by fairness, efficiency, administrability, or whatever
set of criteria the law makes controlling in the situation at hand. But, in
our legal system, no agency or tribunal is a knight-errant. None possesses
a roving commission to do Good and fight Evil wherever found. The authority of all agencies—including Treasury and the IRS—is limited, and
these limits cannot legitimately be exceeded. Thus, the second question
in law is always whether the official or body whose intervention the party
seeks is duly empowered to decree the desirable outcome.291
The second question—legitimacy—is at the core of Loving. At the
level of desirability, the Government may well be right that increased regulation of tax return preparers would serve the public interest. But that
conviction remains idle unless and until Congress cloaks the Treasury with
authority to effect such regulation. In my view, although the question is
close, section 330 does not confer the requisite authority, and the challenged regulations are illegitimate.
The district and circuit courts’ invalidation of the assumedly desirable
but illegitimate regulations need not frustrate the Good for long. Congress always has the power to reverse the decision by amending section
330. In our democratic society, Congress is the ultimate arbiter of
desirability.
Beyond its practical significance, Loving matters in the ongoing doctrinal disputes about Step One of the Chevron analysis. The decision of the
Loving district court takes a textual and exacting approach to Step One.
This is consistent with the contemporary, dominant—though certainly not
universal—approach. The ultimate outcome in Loving will influence future Step One jurisprudence.
It will be interesting as well to see what role Brown & Williamson plays
in future cases. The invocation of that precedent in more than passing
Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991);
Hoffman v. Conn. Income Maint. Dep’t, 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
290. Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (D.D.C. 2013).
291. As the Supreme Court recently underscored: “No matter how it is
framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory authority.” City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
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fashion could help entrench the hyper-textual mode of interpretation and
the major question exception to administrative deference.
VIII.

EPILOGUE

As this Article was in the editing process, the D.C. Circuit issued its
decision in Loving. As predicted by this Article, the panel unanimously
affirmed the district court’s decision.292 The panel invoked rationales
strikingly similar to the arguments advanced in this Article.
The panel held: “Put in Chevron parlance, the IRS’s interpretation [of
section 330] fails at Chevron [S]tep 1 because it is foreclosed by the statute.
In any event, the IRS’s interpretation would also fail at Chevron [S]tep 2
because it is unreasonable in light of the statute’s text, history, structure,
and context.”293
The panel offered six reasons for its conclusion. First, the panel
looked to the statutory term “representatives,” which Part V of this Article
identified as a rationale superior to that stressed by the district court. The
panel acknowledged that a “tax-return preparer certainly assists the taxpayer, but the tax-return preparer does not represent the taxpayer.”294 A
preparer “cannot legally bind the taxpayer by acting on the taxpayer’s behalf” and so is not a “representative” within the contemplation of section
330.295
The panel’s remaining five rationales involved the statutory phrase
“practice . . . before the Department of the Treasury,” the history of section 330, the broader statutory framework of provisions governing return
preparation, the importance of the issue, and the fact that, for generations
before promulgation of the 2011 regulations, the IRS had interpreted section 330 as insufficient authority by which to regulate preparers.296
Although the circuit court’s discussion of these considerations resembled the district court’s discussion at many points, the Supreme Court’s
Brown & Williamson decision (discussed in Part VI of this Article) occupied
a more prominent place in the former than in the latter. First, although
acknowledging that post-enactment history can sometimes be a hazardous
guide, the circuit panel saw post-1884 events as forming the sort of pattern
that Brown & Williamson took as the basis of its statutory construction.297
Second, the panel invoked Brown & Williamson’s “major question” exception to Chevron deference, noting that “courts should not lightly presume
292. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
293. Id. at 1022.
294. Id. at 1017.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1016–22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1)).
297. See id. at 1020–21; see also supra notes 245–78, 280–84 and accompanying
text.
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congressional intent to implicitly delegate decisions of major economic or
political significance to agencies.”298
Although the Government did not seek Supreme Court review of Loving, amending section 330 to reverse the effect of Loving remains a possibility. However, Congress has been in near gridlock for several years, and
the IRS’s credibility with Congress remains damaged as a result of well
publicized junket excesses by the IRS and the IRS’s questionable handling
of applications for tax exemption by conservative political organizations.299 Thus, timing may not be propitious for such a legislative
initiative.
Administrative action in a different form is another possibility. One
approach might be voluntary, rather than compulsory. That is, the IRS
could create a specially recognized class of preparer/representatives for
those who choose to meet criteria like those in the 2011 regulations.
Some preparers may find this attractive, whether for perceived competitive
benefits in the marketplace or because of privileges or benefits the IRS
might confer. To some extent, a carrot might work even if Loving prohibits the stick.300
Sometimes regulation—like nature—abhors a vacuum. If, for reasons
political and doctrinal, efforts prove unavailing to achieve greater federal
regulation of tax return preparers, efforts may intensify at the state level.
Only a few states currently substantially regulate preparers.301 It is too
early to say with confidence what effect Loving will have on this picture.302
In short, it appears probable that the 2011 regulations will not provide a firm foundation for stricter federal regulation of tax return
preparers. However, it would be unwise to assume that the campaign for
tighter regulation—in one form or another—is over.303

298. Id. at 1021; see also supra notes 285–90 and accompanying text.
299. See generally Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative
Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013).
300. See Vincent R. Barrella & Walter Antognini, Loving: A Case for Overreaching, 91 TAXES 33, 44 (2013); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 172–73 (both discussing
this alternative).
301. See supra note 28.
302. See Patrick Temple-West, New York Regulates Tax Preparers as U.S. IRS Effort
Drifts, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2013, 10:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
12/24/us-usa-tax-preparer-idUSBRE9BM0U920131224.
303. See Ariel Alvarez, The Constitutionality of the Inevitable Regulations of All Tax
Return Preparers, 14 J. ACCOUNTING, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 735 (2013); Katherine M.
Hetherington, Regulation of Paid Tax-Return Preparers: A Foregone Conclusion Regardless of the Result in the Loving Case, I SUFFOLK U.L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2013) (maintaining that greater regulation of return preparers is inevitable).

